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fall within the scope of the meaning of the word "supplies" as
it is used in the Fictitious Payee Act.44 Thus, under the Fictitious
Payee Act the agent's intent and knowledge is pertinent in deter-
mining whether the fictitious payee doctrine is applicable in the
situation where the agent does nothing more than to induce the
preparation and signing of the instrument. 4
B. Lloyd Magruder
The Defenses' of Want and Failure of Consideration
in Negotiable Instruments
The defense of want 2 of consideration asserts that no con-
sideration ever existed for the negotiable instrument.4  There
44. Citizens Loan & Security Co. v. Trust Co. of Georgia, 79 Ga. App. 184,
53 S.E.2d 179 (1949), 3 VAND. L. REV. 109; Hillman v. Kropp Forge Co., 340 Ill.
App. 606, 92 N.E.2d 537 (1950) ; Prugh, Combest and Land, Inc. v. Linwood State
Bank, 241 S.W.2d 83 (Mo. App. 1951), 3 HASTINGS L.J. 58 (1951) ; Southall v.
Columbia Nat. Bank, 244 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. App. 1951) ; Swift and Co. v. Bank-
ers Trust Co., 280 N.Y. 135, 19 N.E.2d 992 (1939). In the Hillman case the court
said that "the name was supplied by Lane, an employee within the meaning of
the amendment, since he was an integral part of the required procedure established
by defendant, which ultimately led to the issuance of the checks in question. The
fact that his duties did not call upon him to prepare, execute or issue the checks
in question would not take it out of the amendment." Id. at 612, 92 N.E.2d at 539.
45. For a discussion of this problem, see Boardman, Proper Construction of
the so-called "Bankers' Amendment" and its Significance Respecting Forgery
Claims Under Bankers' Blanket Bonds, 1950 INs. COUNSEL J. 166. It is interest-
ing to note that the last clause of Missouri's NIL § 9(3) reads: "or was known to
his employee or other agent who supplies or causes to be inserted the name of such
payee." (Emphasis added.) Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 401.009 (1952).
1. This Comment does not include actions instituted by a maker to cancel a
note on the ground of want or failure of consideration. As regards such suits, how-
ever, see Fisher v. Rice Growers' Bank, 122 Ark. 600, 184 S.W. 36 (1916).
2. "Want," "lack," and "absence" of consideration are synonymous terms. The
term "absence" is used in § 28 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (here-
after referred to as the NIL). LA. R.S. 7:28 (1950). The Uniform Commercial
Code in § 3-408 uses the term "want." In court opinions the terms most common-
ly used are "want" and "lack."
3. Under the NIL, "consideration" is defined in § 25 in terms of "value." This
section provides: "Value is any consideration sufficient to support a simple con-
tract. An antecedent or pre-existing debt constitutes value, and is deemed such
whether the instrument is payable on demand or at a future time." LA. R.S. 7:25
(1950). See also Uniform Commercial Code § 3-408.
In Robinson Lumber Co. v. Tracka & Boudreau, 134 So. 430, 431 (La. App.
1931), it was said: "A valuable consideration may, in general terms, be said to
consist either in some right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to the party who
makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss, responsibility or act, or
labor or service on the other side; and if either of these exist, it will furnish a
sufficient valuable consideration to sustain the making or indorsing of a promis-
sory note in favor of the payee or other holder." Citing Benner v. Van Norden,
27 La. Ann. 473 (1875).
4. First State Bank v. Radke, 51 N.D. 246, 199 N.W. 930 (1924). See also
Killeen's Estate, 310 Pa. 182, 165 At]. 34 (1932). It is to be noted that there
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would be a want of consideration, for example, when a note is
issued as a gift,5 or when the instrument is signed for the pur-
pose of accommodating another.6 The defense of failure of con-
sideration, on the other hand, admits that there was considera-
tion for the instrument in its inception, but alleges that the con-
sideration has wholly or partially ceased to exist.8 Thus, if a
note is given for the purchase price of equipment, a failure of
consideration occurs when the equipment subsequently proves
unsatisfactory.9 Although some decisions loosely refer to "want"
and "failure" of consideration as if they were synonymous, 0 in
some jurisdictions the distinction between the two terms pro-
duces procedural and substantive differences between these de-
fenses.
Availability of Want or Failure of Consideration as a Defense
Want and failure of consideration are not defenses against
a holder in due course." Under Section 28 of the Uniform Ne-
gotiable Instruments Law (NIL) ,12 the general rule is stated
may be a "partial want" of consideration for a negotiable instrument. Thus in
Sharp v. Sharp, 4 Ohio App. 418 (1915), a note was made for $2,000.00, which
represented a $250.00 debt the maker owed the payee, and $1,750.00 as a simple
gift to the payee. The court sustained the defense of a partial want of consid-
ration urged as to the $1,750.00 gift.
Want of consideration is to be distinguished from the separate defense of "il-
legality of consideration," which latter defense is not within the scope of this
Comment. On illegality of consideration, see Maison Blanche Co. v. Putfark, 119
So. 289 (La. App. 1928).
5. Dickinson v. Carroll, 21 N.D. 271, 130 N.W. 829 (1911).
6. Caskey v. Crawley, 134 So. 711 (La. App. 1931).
7. For a thorough treatment of what constitutes a failure of consideration, see
Note, 25 COLum. L. REV. 83 (1925).
8. First State Bank v. Radke, 51 N.D. 246, 199 N.W. 930 (1924). See also
Brown v. Wright, 17 Ark. 9 (1856).
9. Maison Blanche v. Putfark, 119 So. 289 (La. App. 1928). A failure of
consideration also arises when a note is given for the price of a meat display coun-
ter which is later not delivered. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Setliff, 44 So.2d 167
(La. App. 1950).
10. See LeBlanc v. Sanglair, 12 Mart. (O.S.) 402 (La. 1822) ; Hudson v. Moon,
42 Utah 377, 130 Pac. 774 (1913); McKenzie v. Oregon Improvement Co., 5
Wash. 409, 31 Pac. 748 (1892). But the distinction has been expressly indicated
in Columbia Restaurant v. Sadnovick, 157 So. 280 (La. App. 1934) ; Iaccuzzo v.
Cole, 135 So. 750 (La. App. 1931).
11. NIL §§ 28, 57, 58; LA. R.S. 7:28, 7:57-58 (1950). See also Commercial
Germania Trust & Savings Bank v. Southwestern Ins. Co., 145 La. 367, 82 So.
373 (1919).
Under proper circumstances, some jurisdictions hold that the payee may be a
holder in due course. See Annots., 15 A.L.R. 437 (1921) ; 21 A.L.R. 1365 (1922) ;
26 A.L.R. 769 (1923) ; 32 A.L.R. 289 (1924) ; 68 A.L.R. 962 (1930) ; 97 A.L.R.
1215 (1935) ; 142 A.L.R. 489 (1943) ; 169 A.L.R. 1455 (1947). See also Com-
ment, 36 YALE L.J. 608 (1927) ; Note, 7 FORDHAM L. REV. 90 (1938) ; Note, 21
VA. L. REV. 707 (1935).
12. LA. R.S. 7:28 (1950).
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that want"' or failure of consideration is a matter of defense as
against any person not a holder in due course. 14  In this section,
partial want 5 and partial failure of consideration, whether or
not the failure is an ascertained and liquidated amount, are made
defense pro tanto. 0 When Section 28 is read in conjunction
with other provisions of the act,17 exceptions and qualifications
are made to the availability of these defenses as against a holder
for value of accommodation paper, and as against a payee or
endorsee of a bill of exchange.' 8
It is well settled, however, that as between maker and payee,19
drawer and drawee,20 and endorser and endorsee,21 (total or
13. Though the NIL uses the term "absence," for the sake of uniformity the
term "want" is used in this Comment. See note 2 supra.
14. This rule is in effect also stated in NIL § 58. Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code § 3-306, entitled "Rights of one not a holder in due course" it is pro-
vided: "Unless he has the rights of a holder in due course any person takes the
instrument subject to: . . . (c) the defenses of want or failure of consideration."
This language substantially tracks NIL § 28. The language used in NIL § 28 as
to an "ascertained or liquidated amount, or otherwise," is omitted from the Uni-
form Commercial Code since the draftsmen believed it to be superfluous. See
ALI, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, OFFICIAL DRAFT, TEXT AND COMMENTS EDITION
340 (1952).
15. Partial want of consideration is a defense to a suit on a negotiable instru-
ment although the word "partial" is not expressly stated in the text of § 28. The
express mention of "partial" failure of consideration in § 28 was intended to end
the conflicting decisions on the right to interpose it as a defense, whether the
amount was liquidated or not, but it was not intended to alter the common law as
to want of consideration. The right at common law to defend on partial want of
consideration was well recognized. Sharp v. Sharp, 4 Ohio App. 418 (1915).
16. Thus there is a total of four defenses, i.e., want and failure of considera-
tion, and partial want and partial failure of consideration. For brevity, these four
defenses will be referred to collectively hereafter as "the defenses of want or fail-
ure of consideration."
17. See NIL §§ 6, 24, 29, 61, 62.
18. The Orleans Court of Appeal apparently considered that there is a further
exception to § 29 when the consideration for the note is a contractual undertaking
of the payee. In the case of Boelte v. West, 185 So. 471 (La. App. 1939), defend-
ant executed a note as consideration for an undertaking by a private educational
institution to furnish him instruction by correspondence. In a suit to enforce pay-
ment of this note the court held that the defenses of failure or non-tender of per-
formance of the contract to furnish instruction could not be set up even though
the holder was a party to the contract from which the note arose. For adverse
criticism of this case see Note, 2 LoUISIANA LAW REVIEW 189 (1939).
19. Bernard Bros. v. Dugas, 229 La. 181, 85 So.2d 257 (1956) (failure) ; Moss
v. Robinson, 216 La. 295, 43 So. 613 (1949) (want) ; Belknap Hardware & Mfg.
Co. v. Hearn, 179 La. 909, 155 So. 396 (1934) (want or failure) ; Shaddock v.
Hawkins, 190 So. 843 (La. App. 1939) (want) ; Maison Blanche Co. v. Putfark,
119 So. 289 (La. App. 1928) (failure) ; Brown v. King, 7 La. App. 570 (1928)
(want). If the maker signs the note for the accommodation of the payee, want
of consideration is a defense. See note 25 infra.
20. National Park Bank v. Saitta, 127 App. Div. 624, 111 N.Y. Supp. 927
(1st Dept. 1908). If the drawee accepts the bill for the accommodation of the
drawer, want of consideration is a defense. See note 25 infra.
21. Kugman v. Donnell, 271 S.W. 535 (Mo. App. 1925) (want); Dittmar v.
Frye, 200 Wash. 451, 93 P.2d 709 (1939) (want) ; State Bank v. Morrison, 85
Wash. 182, 147 Pac. 875 (1915) (want). If the endorser signs the note for the
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partial) 22 want and failure of consideration are defenses to a
suit on a negotiable instrument. It is also clear that the maker
of a non-accommodation note may urge these defenses against
a holder not in due course.23 Regardless of the capacity in which
the litigants are parties to the instrument, as between an ac-
commodation party24 and the accommodated party, want of con-
sideration is a defense.25
Availability of the Defenses as Against a Holder for Value of
Accommodation Paper
Section 29 of the NIL provides that an accommodation party
"is liable on the instrument to a holder for value notwithstand-
ing'such holder at the time of taking the instrument knew him
to be only an accommodation party. ' 2 This section eliminates
the defenses of want 27 of consideration when the holder for
accommodation of the endorsee, want of consideration is a defense. See note 25
infra.
22. See note 16 supra.
23. Commercial Germania Trust & Savings Bank v. Southwestern Surety In-
surance Co., 145 La. 367, 82 So. 373 (1919) ; Bank of Eudora v. Crowe, 2 La.
App. 669 (1925).
24. NIL § 29 defines an accommodation party as "one who has signed the in-
strument as maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser, without receiving value there-
for, and for the purpose of lending his name to some other person." LA. R.S. 7:29
(1950). One who is paid a fee for endorsing a note is an accommodation party.
Carr v. Wainwright, 43 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1930). See Note, 9 TEXAs L. REV. 601
(1931).
A person may become an "accommodation party" even though he is indebted
to the party whom he is attempting to accommodate, so long as the former signs
the instrument with the understanding that it is for accommodation, and this in-
tention is expressed to the party sought to be accommodated. Cox v. Heagy, 184
S.W. 495 (Mo. App. 1916).
It does' not affect the rights of the parties, or prevent the paper from becoming
accommodation paper that the accommodation party has taken security for the
loan, or for the credit. Green v. McCord, 204 Ala. 356, 85 So. 750 (1920) ; Brown
v. Volz, 90 Cal. App.2d 793, 204 P.2d 110 (1949) ; Iglehart v. Todd, 203 Ind. 427,
178 N.E. 685 (1931) ; Warner v. Fallon Coal Mines Co., 246 Mich. 493, 224 N.W.
601 (1929).
25. Caskey v. Crawley, 134 So. 711 (La. App. 1931) ; Gillihan v. Assel, 186
S.D.2d 772 (Mo. App. 1945) ; Robinson v. Linn, 155 Ore. 591, 65 P.2d 669 (1937).
See cases cited 5 Uniform Laws Annotated, Part I, § 29, p. 428, n. 81 (1943)
(endorser signing for accommodation of payee) ; Green v. McCord, 204 Ala. 356,
85 So. 750 (1920) (accommodation drawer) ; First National Bank v. Reed, 198
Cal. 252, 244 Pac. 368 (1926) (maker signing for accommodation of payee);
Gibbs v. The Lido of Worcester, 332 Mass. 426, 125 N.E.2d 406 (1954) (accom-
modation maker) ; Federal Chemical Co. v. Hitt, 155 S.W.2d 899 (Mo. App. 1941).
This result is codified under the Uniform Commercial Code § 3415(5) : "An ac-
commodation party is not liable to the party accommodated, and if he pays the
instrument [he] has a right of recourse on the instrument against such party."
26. LA. R.S. 7:29 (1950). Under the Uniform Commercial Code § 3-415(5)
recovery is expressly allowed on the instrument. See note 25 supra.
27. Since by the nature of accommodation paper the accommodation party re-
ceives no consideration for his signature, there could be no total or partial failure
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value28 takes the instrument before maturity.2 When the holder
for value takes the instrument after maturity, however, the au-
thorities are in conflict as to whether Section 29 should be ap-
plied.80
One line of authority, headed by the case of Marling v. Jones,81
applies Section 29 and permits the holder for value to recover
on the theory that the only effect of maturity is to give con-
structive notice of defenses, which notice would be immaterial
since under the terms of Section 29 even actual knowledge of the
accommodation does not affect the holder's right to recover.82
of consideration. Hence, the defense in such cases would always be one of want
of consideration.
28. "Holder for value" in this instance is used to mean a holder with lnowl-
edge that the defendant is an accommodation party.
29. Bank of Baton Rouge v. Hendrix, 194 La. 478, 193 So. 713 (1940) ; Wil-
liam D. Seymour & Co. v. Castell, 160 La. 371, 107 So. 143 (1926) ; First State
Bank v. Davis, 139 La. 723, 72 So. 185 (1916) ; B. Olinde & Sons, Inc. v. Istrouma
Mercantile, 172 So. 793 (La. App. 1937) ; Exchange National Bank v. Howard-
Kenyon Dredging Co., 130 So. 848 (La. App. 1930) ; I. Baer Co. v. Binion, 125
So. 463 (La. App. 1929) ; Slidell Savings and Homestead Ass'n, 2 La. App. 617
(1925) ; Dean v. Lyde, 223 Ala. 394, 136 So. 857 (1931) ; Peoples' Finance &
Thrift Co. v. Moon, 44 Cal. App.2d 223, 112 P.2d 24 (1941) ; Wilson v. Stowers,
161 Va. 418, 170 S.E. 745 (1933).
Under § 3-415 (2) of the Uniform Commercial Code, clearer language is used:
"When the instrument has been taken for value before it is due the accommoda-
tion party is liable in the capacity in which he has signed even though the taker
knows of the accommodation."
30. For a collection of cases, see Annot., 48 A.L.R. 1280 (1927). This question
has been treated in various periodicals: Notes, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 791 (1925) ;
28 ILL. L. REV. 702 (1934) ; 38 MicH. L. REV. 238 (1939), 18 TEXAS L. REV. 501
(1940). See also BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 563, § 29 (Beutel's
7th ed. 1948). It is to be noted that if the instrument is transferred after maturity
contrary to an express agreement between the parties, the maker could avail him-
self of the defenses of breach of faith under NIL § 58, and breach of conditional
delivery under NIL } 16. But see Wilhoit v. Seavall, 121 Kan. 239, 246 Pac. 1013
(1926), where the transferee after maturity of accommodation paper in breach
of an express agreement against such transfer was said to take the note "subject
to the equities between the parties." This could include the defense of want of
consideration. See textual discussion on page 472 infra.
Uniform Commercial Code § 3-415(2), quoted in the preceding footnote, is
evidently drafted to deny recovery where the instrument is negotiated after ma-
turity, regardless of what the accommodation party may have intended. However,
this section merely states an affirmative that "where the instrument has been
taken for value before it is due" the accommodation party is liable. Hence, it
might still be argued that if in fact the accommodation party had no objections
to after-maturity transfer he would be liable. The wording of UCC § 3-415(2)
would seem inappropriate to cover the situation in which a demand note is signed
for accommodation.
31. 138 Wis. 82, 119 N.W. 931 (1909).
32. Charbonnet v. Reliance Finance Corp., 143 So. 104 (La. App. 1932)
Mersick v. Alderman, 77 Conn. 634, 60 Atl. 109 (1905); Tabor State Bank v.
Rollins, 54 S.D. 521, 223 N.W. 726 (1929). The same result is reached in Illinois
by means of the following addition to § 29: "and in case a transfer after maturity
was intended by the accommodating party notwithstanding such holder acquired
title after maturity." See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Insurance
Corp., 117 F.2d 491 (Mo. Cir. 1941), affirmed 315 U.S. 447 (1941), rehearing
denied, 315 U.S. 830 (1941).
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Further support for this position arises from the legislative
history of Section 29. Since the wording of Section 29 is sub-
stantially similar to that of Section 28 of the English Bills of
Exchange Act,33 it has been contended 4 that it was the intention
of the draftsmen of the NIL to adopt the English rule8 5 permit-
ting recovery. Under this reasoning Section 29 is considered
as being independent of other provisions of the NIL, with the
result that the holders of accommodation paper are accorded
rights which are denied the holders of all other classes of nego-
tiable instruments. Louisiana appears to be in accord with this
position.8"
The majority view, headed by the case of Rylee v. Wilkin-
son,37 is that when a holder for value with knowledge of the
accommodation signature takes the instrument after maturity
Section 29 has no application, and the holder is thus subject to
the defense of want of consideration.3 8  Under this view, accom-
modation paper is not accorded preeminence over other classes
of negotiable instruments, and Section 29 is placed in harmony
with Section 28 which provides that want of consideration is
a defense as against any person not a holder in due course, and
33. The Bills of Exchange Act was enacted by Parliament in 1882. Section 28
of this act reads: ',(1) An accommodation party to a bill is a person who has
signed a bill as drawer, acceptor, or indorser, without receiving value therefor,
and for the purpose of lending his name to some other person. (2) An accom-
modation party is liable on the bill to a holder for value; and it is immaterial
whether, when such holder took the bill, he knew such party to be an accommoda-
tion party or not."
34. Altfillisch v. McCarty, 49 S.D. 203, 207 N.W. 67 (1926).
35. Charles v. Marsden, 1 Taunt 224, 127 Eng. Rep. 818 (1808).
36. Charbonnet v. Reliance Finance Corp., 143 So. 104 (La. App. 1932).
Prior to the adoption of the NIL in Louisiana in 1904, Louisiana courts uniformly
held that the holder for value after maturity of an accommodation note took the
instrument subject to the defense of want of consideration. Carrol v. Peters, 1
McGloin 88 (La. 1880) ; Stetson v. Stackhouse, 18 La. 119 (1841) ; Whitwell,
Bond & Co. v. Crehore, 8 La. 540 (1835). In Carrol v. Peters, supra, the court
recited the conflicting authorities on the issue in a well-considered opinion. In
the Charbonnet decision, however, the opinion merely cites § 29 and makes 1o
reference to the overwhelming authority to the contrary in other states.
37. 134 Miss. 663, 99 So. 901 (1924).
38. Weisner National Bank v. Peters, 174 Ark. 984, 298 S.W. 878 (1927)
Pacific-Southwest Trust & Savings Bank v. Valley Finance Corp., 99 Cal. App.
728, 279 Pac. 222 (1929); Lepori v. Hilson, 109 Cal. App. 295, 293 Pac. 86
(1930) ; Pan-American Bank v. Crawford, 108 Cal. App. 1, 291 Pac. 220 (1930) ;
Liverpool & London & Globe Insurance Co. v. Orrell, 140 Fla. 563, 190 So. 552
(1939) ; Barnhill v. Ow, 145 Kan. 696, 67 P.2d 546 (1937) ; Madigan v. Lum-
bert, 136 Me. 178, 5 A.2d 278 (1939) ; Federal Chemical Co. v. Hitt, 155 S.W.
2d 899 (Mo. App. 1941); Frank L. Dittmeier Real Estate Co. v. Knox, 259
S.W. 835 (Mo. App. 1924) ; Bartels v. Suter, 130 Okla. 7, 266 Pac. 753 (1928) ;
Robinson v. Linn, 155 Ore. 591, 65 P.2d 669 (1937). See also Jackson v. Lan-
caster, 213 Ala. 97, 104 So. 19 (1925) ; National City Bank v. Parr, 205 Ind.
108, 185 N.E. 904 (1933); Chester v. Dorr, 41 N.Y. 279 (1869) (pre-NIL in
New York).
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with Section 58 which declares that a negotiable instrument in
the hands of a holder not in due course is subject to the same
defenses as if the instrument were non-negotiable. This position
appears to be supported by the better reasoning. 9
It has been held that Section 29 has no application, and that
the defense of want of consideration is available as against a
holder for value with knowledge of the accommodation character
of the instrument, unless such holder not only took the instru-
ment before maturity, but is otherwise qualified as a holder in
due course. 40  Under this view the defense of want of consid-
eration is available if the holder for value took the accommoda-
tion instrument with notice that the instrument is tainted with
fraud or other defect. 41  Making the defense of want of consid-
eration available under such circumstances does not appreciably
enhance defendant's position since a valid defense is made out
when plaintiff's knowledge of the fraud or other defect is estab-
lished.42
39. Concerning this problem one writer has advocated the view that the real
defense is not lack of consideration, but rather whether there has been a condi-
tional delivery of the instrument. See Note, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 791 (1924). (For
instances when there is an express agreement not to transfer the instrument
after maturity, see note 30 supra.) Under this view it is presumed that when one
signs as an accommodation party the fair implication is that he intends to lend
his credit only until the maturity of the paper. Transfer after maturity, there-
fore, under NIL § 16 would be a violation of the accommodation party's condi-
tional delivery of the paper which may be asserted as a defense against the holder
not in due course. Professor Steffen criticizes this view as not covering the
frequent case where the accommodation party was actually indifferent as to
whether negotiation was before or after maturity. STEFFEN, CASES ON COMMER-
CIAL AND INVESTMENT PAPER 887 (2d ed. 1954). Such was the case in Mersick
v. Alderman, 77 Conn. 634, 60 Atl. 109 (1905). In this case the court followed
the minority view and held the defense of want of consideration not available
against the transferee for value after maturity.
40. National City Bank v. Parr, 205 Ind. 108, 185 N.E. 904 (1933). In this
regard see also Wilhoit v. Seavall, 121 Kan. 239, 246 Pac. 1013 (1926), wherein
the accommodation paper was transferred after maturity in violation of an ex-
press agreement. See note 30 supra. The court held for defendant on the ground
that the purchaser after maturity took the note "subject to the equities between
the parties."
Massachusetts has adopted this view by amending § 29, substituting the words
"holder in due course" in lieu of the words "holder for value."
41. National City Bank v. Parr, 205 Ind. 108, 185 N.E. 904 (1933).
42. This view is criticized in Note, 28 ILL. L. REV. 702 (1934), the writer
pointing out that this view would work an injustice, for example, in cases where
the accommodation paper was incomplete on its face and authority was given
to the holder to complete the instrument. Under such circumstances, the fact
that the instrument was incomplete on its face would disqualify the holder of due
course status, and would permit the accommodation party to urge the defense of
want of consideration against him even though the note was completed in accord-
ance with the agreement.
COMMENTS
Availability of the Defenses as Against a Payee or Endorsee of
a Bill of Exchange
Before acceptance or dishonor, the drawer of a bill is sec-
ondarily liable on the instrument.48  If the drawee refuses to
accept the bill, or otherwise dishonors the instrument, however,
the drawer becomes liable to the holder of the instrument.44
Under such circumstances, Sections 28 and 58 of the NIL permit
the drawer to assert the defenses of want and failure of con-
sideration as against the payee, and as against an endorsee of
the bill who is not a holder in due course.45 If the drawee accepts
the bill, however, under Section 62 he promises that he will pay
the instrument according to the tenor of his acceptance. 46 Under
this provision, the drawee's promise to pay is independent of
any consideration which he may have received for his acceptance
from the drawer.47 In a suit on an accepted bill,48 therefore,
want or failure of consideration as between the drawer and
drawee is not a defense as against the payee, or a holder for
value.49  However, the drawee may avail himself of these de-
fenses if he accepts the instrument on the express condition
that the consideration between him and the drawer does not
fail.50
Authority exists for the proposition that where a want or
failure of consideration occurs between the drawer and drawee,
even though the acceptance is unconditional, the defenses of
want or failure of consideration are available to the drawee as
against a holder or payee who gave no consideration for his title
43. NIL §61; LA. R.S. 7:61 (1950).
44. Ibid.
45. LA. R.S. 7:28, 7:58 (1950) ; Krumbhaar v. Ludeling, 3 Mart.(O.S.) 640
(La. 1815) (pre-NIL in Louisiana).
46. LA. R.S. 7:62 (1950): "The acceptor by accepting the instrument en-
gages that he will pay it according to the tenor of his acceptance."
47. Deen v. De Soto National Bank, 97 Fla. 862, 122 So. 105 (1929). See
also cases in note 49 infra.
48. It is immaterial when the acceptance is made. Whether a payee or en-
dorsee acquires the instrument before or after acceptance does not affect his right
to recovery. National Park Bank v. Saitta, 127 App. Div. 624, 111 N.Y. Supp.
927 (1st Dept. 1908).
49. Cuesta Rey & Co. v. Newsom, 102 Fla. 853, 136 So. 551 (1931) (drawee
accepted for accommodation of drawer) ; Huston v. Newgrass, 234 Ill. 285, 84
N.E. 910 (1908) (drawee accepted for accommodation of drawer); Mt. Vernon
National Bank v. Kelling-Karel Co., 189 Ill. App. 375 (1914) ; International
Banking Corp. v. Morcott Co., 184 N.Y. Supp. 747 (Sup. Ct. 1920) (failure of
consideration between drawer and drawee). Contra: Texas has reached the op-
posite result by relying on a Texas statute not included within the NIL. See
Hoffer v. Eastland National Bank, 169 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
50. International Banking Corp. v. Morcott Co., 184 N.Y. Supp. 474 (Sup.
Ct. 1920).
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to the instrument, or whose title is based on a consideration
which has failed."' This position is probably based on the theory
that it would be inequitable to allow a plaintiff who gave nothing
for his title to enforce the instrument against the drawee who
accepted the instrument on the faith that the drawer would
provide the agreed consideration. If the drawee accepted the
instrument for the accommodation of the drawer, it is clear that
under Section 29 the drawee may set up the defense of want
of consideration as against a party not a holder for value.5 2
The Presumption of Consideration in Negotiable Instruments
In a suit on a negotiable instrument, the plaintiff is not
required to allege that the paper was issued for consideration.58
When the plaintiff introduces the note as evidence, and the de-
fendant admits the execution of the instrument, there arises a
presumption that the instrument was issued for a valuable con-
sideration. 4  This presumption stems from Section 24 of the
NIL,55 which provides that "every negotiable instrument is
51. National Park Bank v. Saitta, 127 App. Div. 624, 111 N.Y. Supp. 927
(1st Dept. 1908). No other cases were found on the point.
52. NIL §29; LA. R.S. 7:29 (1950): "An accommodation party is one who
has signed the instrument as . . . acceptor . . . , without receiving value therefor,
and for the purpose of lending his name to some other person. Such a person is
liable on the instrument to a holder for value, notwithstanding such holder at the
time of taking the instrument knew him to be only an accommodation party."
53. Sapp v. Lifrand, 44 Ariz. 321, 36 P.2d 794 (1934) ; Pettay v. Cavin, 59
Ohio App. 531, 18 N.E.2d 996 (1936). In his petition, the plaintiff would, how-
ever, recite the contents of the note, and allege that the defendant signed the in-
strument. See LA. CODE OF PRACTICE arts. 324-326 (1870).
54. Bevis v. Alexander, 88 So.2d 398 (La. App. 1956) ; Iaccuzzo v. Fabregas,
12 So.2d 16 (La. App. 1943) ; laccuzzo v. Cole, 135 So. 750 (La. App. 1931) ;
Huntington v. Shute, 180 Mass. 371, 62 N.E. 380 (1902). Under Louisiana's
practice, if the plaintiff alleges in his petition that the defendant signed the in-
strument, the defendant is bound to acknowledge expressly or deny his signature
in his answer. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 324 (1870) ; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2244
(1870). If the defendant denies the signature, then the plaintiff must prove that
it is authentic. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 325 (1870). Article 326 then pro-
vides that after the defendant has denied that the signature is his, if the plain-
tiff proves the genuineness of the signature, the defendant is barred from every
other defense, and judgment will be given against defendant without further pro-
ceedings. Under this procedure, the genuineness of defendant's signature will
usually be admitted before the case comes to trial.
55. LA. R.S. 7:24 (1950). Under the Uniform Commercial Code, value is di-
vorced from consideration in UCC § 3-303. Under the UCC consideration is im-
portant only on the question of whether the obligation of a party can be enforced
against him. See ALI, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, OFFICIAL DRAFT, TEXT AND
COMMENTS EDITION 329 (1952). NIL § 24 is generally replaced by UCC § 3-307
relating to the burden of establishing signatures and defenses, which provides in
part: "(1) Unless specifically denied in the pleadings, each signature on an in-
strument is admitted .... (2) When signatures are admitted or established, pro-
duction of the instrument entitles a holder to recover on it unless the defendant
establishes a defense." Thus under the provisions of this section, in the absence
of a defense, any holder is entitled to recover and there is no occasion to resort
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deemed prima facie to have been issued for a valuable consid-
eration; and every person whose signature appears thereon [is
deemed prima facie] to have become a party thereto for value."56
This statutory presumption of consideration is a rebuttable pre-
sumption of fact extending to any fact which, under the circum-
stances of the parties, might reasonably supply a consideration.57
The presence of the words "value received" on the face of the
instrument,5" or the fact that the instrument is under seal, 59 does
not affect this presumption. The suit having proceeded thus
far, the plaintiff is said to have established a prima facie case
for recovery on the instrument.60
to any presumption of consideration in order to establish a prima facie case for
recovery on the instrument.
56. NIL § 24 applies to a person whose signature appears upon the instrument
even though he affixed his signature thereto after the execution and delivery of
the instrument. Greenwood v. Lamson, 106 Vt. 37, 168 Atl. 915 (1933) ; Dittmar
v. Frye, 200 Wash. 451, 93 P.2d 709 (1939). See Annot., 124 A.L.R. 717 (1940).
Cases are numerous which apply § 24 to notes. Section 24 was also applied to
bills in Strain v. Security Title Insurance Co., 124 Cal. App.2d 195, 268 P.2d
167 (1954) ; National Park Bank v. Saitta, 127 App. Div. 624, 111 N.Y. Supp.
927 (1st Dept. 1908).
57. Drake v. Seck, 116 Kan. 717, 229 Pac. 67 (1924).
58. The presence of the words "value received" on the face of the instrument
of itself is a prima facie acknowledgment or admission by the makers that
a sufficient consideration was received. Hance Hardware Co. v. Howard, 1
Terry 209, 8 A.2d 30 (Del. 1939) ; Tremont Trust Co. v. Brand, 244 Mass. 421,
138 N.E. 564 (1923) ; In re Dashnau's Estate, 194 Misc. 156, 88 N.Y.S.2d 13
(Surr. Ct. 1948) ; Blanshan v. Russel, 32 App. Div. 103, 52 N.Y. Supp. 963
(3d Dept. 1898). See other cases cited in 5 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED, Part I,
§ 24, p. 274, n. 41 (1943). The practical effect of the inclusion of these words
on the face of the instrument is to effect an "additional presumption" that the
note was issued for a valuable consideration. Both the statutory presumption
and the "additional presumption" are rebuttable presumptions, and thus any evi-
dence sufficient to overcome the statutory presumption will likewise overcome
the "additional presumption" arising from the inclusion of the words "value re-
ceived" on the face of the instrument. The omission of the words "value received"
does not impair an instrument or weaken the statutory presumption that it was
given for value. Roux v. Morey, 128 Me. 428, 148 Atl. 406 (1930) ; McLeod v.
Hunter, 29 Misc. 558, 61 N.Y. Supp. 73 (Sup. Ct. 1899).
59. Under NIL § 6(4) it is provided that: "The validity and negotiable char-
acter of an instrument are not affected by the fact that . . . [it] bears a seal."
LA. R.S. 7:6(4) (1950). Under this section the states which have considered
the question have held that the seal simply creates a second rebuttable presump-
tion of consideration and does not affect the availability of want of consideration
as a defense. As in the case where "value received" is placed on the face of the
instrument, any evidence sufficient to overcome the statutory presumption will
likewise overcome this additional presumption arising from the seal. Peavy v.
General Securities Corp., 208 Ga. 82, 65 S.E.2d 149 (1951); Trustees of Jesse
Parker Williams Hospital v. Nisbet, 189 Ga. 807, 7 S.E.2d 737 (1940) ; Citizens
National Bank v. Custis, 153 Md. 235, 138 Atl. 261 (1927) ; Mills v. Bonin, 239
N.C. 498, 80 S.E.2d 365 (1954).
Under § 3-113 of the Uniform Commercial Code it is provided that "an instru-
ment otherwise negotiable is within this article even though it is under a seal."
This is a restatement of the rule obtaining under the NIL.
60. Bernard Bros. v. Dugas, 229 La. 181, 85 So.2d 257 (1956) ; Moss v.
Robinson, 216 La. 295, 43 So.2d 613 (1949) ; Bevins v. Alexander, 88 So.2d 398
(La. App. 1956); Huntington v. Shute, 180 Mass. 371, 62 N.E. 380 (1902);
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Though the authorities are in conflict on the point, some
courts hold that, if the plaintiff is not content to rest on this
presumption of consideration, but instead introduces evidence
toward establishing a consideration, he thereby waives his right
to rely on the presumption and can avail himself only of the
evidence which he has adduced. 61
Pleadings, and Proof Required to Establish the Defenses
The NIL does not prescribe rules of procedure under which
the defenses of want and failure of consideration are to be estab-
lished. The procedure required to establish these defenses varies
among the jurisdictions.
Pleadings. In Louisiana the defense sought to be established
should be specially pleaded.6 2  One Louisiana court, however,
considered a defense of failure of consideration, although it was
not clearly pleaded in the answer, when the allegations made in
the answer suggested that failure of consideration was the
ground on which defendant resisted plaintiff's demand. 63
Although the plea of "want or failure" of consideration appears
to be acceptable to the courts,64 care should be taken to insure
that the defense is properly named.6 5 Under a plea of want of
consideration, defendant need not allege the circumstances under
which the instrument is given.66 When a failure of considera-
tion is pleaded, however, defendant must allege the time, place,
and circumstances of such failure.67  Under the proper plead-
Collateral Liquidation v. Manning, 287 Mich. 568, 283 N.W. 691 (1939) ; In re
Wood's Estate, 229 Mich. 635, 1 N.W.2d 19 (1941).
61. Beh v. Van Ness, 190 Iowa 151, 180 N.W. 292 (1920) ; Geddes v. McElroy,
171 Iowa 633, 154 N.W. 320 (1915) ; Matter of Pinkerton, 49 Misc. 363, 99 N.Y.
Supp. 492 (Surr. Ct. 1906), rejecting a contrary view expressed in the earlier
New York case of Durland v. Durland, 153 N.Y. 67, 47 N.E. 42 (1897). Contra,
Collateral Liquidation v. Manning, 287 Mich. 568, 283 N.W. 691 (1939), citing
the early New York view as announced in Durland r. Durland, supra; Citizens
National Bank v. Custis, 153 Md. 235, 138 Atl. 261 (1927).
62. Kizer v. Garnier, 89 So.2d 119 (La. 1956) ; Columbia Restaurant v. Sadno-
vick, 157 So. 280 (La. App. 1934). See LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 327 (1870).
In the Kizer case, defendant failed to plead the defense of failure of consideration
and the court ruled inadmissible evidence to establish the defense.
63. Carreras v. Hollister's Heirs, 197 So. 815 (La. App. 1940).
64. Bernard Bros. v. Dugas, 229 La. 181, 85 So.2d 257 (1956); Daniel v.
Hernandez, 173 So. 482 (La. App. 1937) (semble).
65. Apparently the defendant need plead either "want" or "failure" of con-
sideration, and need not specify whether it is "total" or "partial."
66. Columbia Restaurant v. Sadnovick, 157 So. 280 (La. App. 1934) ; B. C.
Napier & Co. v. Feltner, 216 Ky. 509, 287 S.W. 974 (1926) ; Zebold v. Hurst, 65
Okla. 248, 166 Pac. 99 (1917).
67. Columbia Restaurant v. Sadnovick, 157 So. 280 (La. App. 1934) ; Indiana
Flooring Co. v. Rudnick, 236 Mass. 90, 127 N.E. 428 (1920).
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ings, if the plaintiff is subject to the defense of want or failure
of consideration, parol evidence is admissible to establish the
defense.68
Burden of proof. Prior to the adoption of the NIL, many
jurisdictions considered the defenses of want and failure of con-
sideration as being so dissimilar in nature that the burden of
proving want of consideration and that of proving failure of
consideration were placed on different parties.69 Under the
NIL, however, it is generally held that inasmuch as Section 28
treats "failure" and "want" of consideration in the same clause,
and makes both matters of defense, it was the intention of the
framers to abolish the distinctions regarding the burden of
proof, and to place both defenses on the same plane.70
The various jurisdictions are not in accord on the question
of whether plaintiff or defendant bears the ultimate burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence his position on the
issue of the presence of consideration. This burden is some-
times called the "burden of persuasion. '7 1  The overwhelming
weight of authority places the burden of persuasion on defendant
to establish his defense of want or failure of consideration. 72
68. Goldsmith v. Parsons, 182 La. 122, 161 So. 175 (1935); Balknap Hard-
ware & Mfg. Co. v. Hearn, 179 La. 909, 155 So. 396 (1934) ; Robichaux v. Block,
144 La. 859, 81 So. 371 (1919). Parol evidence is admissible to show whether a
party signed for accommodation and to show who was accommodated thereby.
Palmer v. Oscar Dowling Food Products, 174 La. 923, 142 So. 127 (1932);
Davenport & Harris Undertaking Co. v. Roberson, 219 Ala. 203, 121 So. 733
(1929) ; Jeffrey v. Jeffrey, 157 Miss. 187, 127 So. 296 (1930) ; Haddock Blan-
chard & Co. v. Haddock, 192 N.Y. 499, 85 N.E. 682 (1908).
69. Many courts placed the burden of proving the issue by a preponderance
of the evidence on plaintiff when want of consideration was pleaded, and on de-
fendant when the defense was failure of consideration. For example, see the
following Massachusetts cases: Jennison v. Stafford, 1 Cush 168, 48 Am. Dec.
594 (1848) (failure) ; Delano v. Bartlett, 6 Cush 364 (1850) (want). For a
collection of cases, see Annot., 35 A.L.R. 1370, 1376, 1395 (1925).
70. First State Bank v. Radke, 51 N.D. 246, 199 N.W. 930 (1924). See also
Shaffer v. Bond, 129 Md. 648, 99 At. 973 (1917) ; Echels v. Cornell Economizer
Co., 119 Md. 107, 86 Atl. 38 (1912) ; Leonard v. Woodward, 305 Mass. 332, 25
N.E.2d 705 (1940) ; Veino v. Bedell, 99 N.H. 274, 109 A.2d 555 (1954) ; Ben-
jamin v. Blake, 121 N.J.L. 10, 1 A.2d 263 (1938). See Note, 25 COLUM. L. REv.
98 (1925). For a collection of cases, see BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
LAW 485 (Beutel's 7th ed. 1948). For a more recent listing, see note 72 infra.
71. See McCORMIcK, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 638, § 307 (1954). Wigmore
terms this the risk of "non-persuasion." 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2485 (3d ed.
1940).
72. Due to the dual sense in which "burden of proof" is used, it is often
difficult to determine when the court is speaking of the "burden of persuasion,"
or the "duty of producing evidence." See note 82 infra. The following cases
placed the burden of persuasion on defendant: Porter v. Porter, 224 Ala. 182,
12 So.2d 186 (1943) ; Lackey v. Thomas, 26 Ala. App. 65, 153 So. 287 (1933),
reversed on other grounds, 228 Ala. 106, 153 So. 289 (1934) (failure) ; Chernov
v. Sandell, 68 Ariz. 327, 206 P.2d 348 (1949) (want and failure)' (aemble);
19571
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This view is based on the premise that under NIL Section 28,
want and failure of consideration are intended to be affirmative
defenses which must be pleaded and proved by the defendant.7 8
This appears to be a sound position. In these jurisdictions where
Gray v. McDougal, 223 Ark. 97, 264 S.W.2d 403 (1954) (want and failure);
Portuguese American Bank v. Schultz, 49 Cal. App. 508, 193 Pac. 806 (1920)
(failure); Hickman-Lunbeck Grocery Co. v. lager, 75 Colo. 554, 227 Pac. 829
(1924) (want and failure); Kessler v. Valerio, 102 Conn. 696, 129 Atl. 788
(1925) (want and failure); Ajax Rubber Co. v. Rothacker, 1 Harr. 376, 114
Atl. 610 (Del. 1921) (want) ; Sheriger v. Gruner, 34 A.2d 35 (D.C. Mun. App.
1943) (want); Ray v. Marett, 84 Ga. App. 86, 65 S.E.2d 646 (1951) (want
and failure) ; Colorado Milling & Elevator Co. v. Proctor, 58 Idaho 578, 76 P.2d
438 (1938) (want) ; First National Bank v. Doschades, 47 Idaho 661, 279 Pac.
416 (1929) (failure) ; Rose v. Plotke, 343 Ill. App. 647, 99 N.E.2d 714 (1951)
(want) ; American National Bank v. Woolard, 342 Ill. 148, 173 N.E. 787 (1930)
(failure); Kelley, Glover, & Vale, Inc. v. Heitman, 220 Ind. 625, 44 N.E.2d
981 (1942) (failure) ; Citizens Loan & Trust Co. v. Boyles, 102 Ind. App. 157,
1 N.E.2d 292 (1936) (want); Denver v. Silver, 109 Atl. 67 (Ind. App. 1919)
(want and failure) ; Hazen v. Ferriter, 124 Kan. 261, 259 Pac. 788 (1927)
(want) ; Balph v. Broadhurst, 121 Kan. 82, 245 Pac. 745 (1926) (failure);
Rose v. Callahan, 284 S.W. 838 (Ky. App. 1955) (want) ; Eisenman v. Austen,
132 Me. 214, 169 Ati. 162 (1933) (want) ; Guarantee Food Co. v. Consumers
Fuel Co., 123 Me. 518, 123 Ati. 518 (1924) (failure) ; Leonard v. Woodward,
305 Mass. 332, 25 N.E. 705 (1940) (want and failure) ; Ruler v. Nasser, 322
Mich. 1, 33 N.W.2d 637 (1948) (failure) ; Erickson-Hellekson-Vye Co. v. A.
Wells Co., 217 Minn. 361, 15 N.W.2d 162 (1944) (want) ; Douglas v. Warren,
44 So.2d 853 (Miss. 1950) (failure) ; Milstead v. Maples, 180 Miss. 476, 177
So. 790 (1938) (want) ; Simmon v. Marion, 227 S.W.2d 127 (Mo. App. 1950)
(want); C.I.T. Corp. v. Byrnes, 38 S.W.2d 750 (Mo. App. 1931) (failure);
Farmers' & Miners' State Bank v. Probst, 81 Mont. 248, 263 Pac. 693 (1928)
(want) ; Johnson v. Hansen, 139 Neb. 428, 297 N.W. 643 (1941) (want) ; Laux
v. Batterman, 135 Neb. 386, 281 N.W. 799 (1938) (failure) ; Walker Bros.
Bankers v. Janney, 52 Nev. 440, 290 Pac. 413 (1930) (failure) ; Veino v. Bedell,
99 N.H. 264, 109 A.2d 555 (1954) (want and failure) ; Benjamin v. Blake, 121
N.J.L. 10, 1 A.2d 263 (1938) (want and failure) ; In re Kaspari's Estate, 71
N.W.2d 558 (N.D. 1955) (want) ; Goldammer-Cranna-Weaver Co. v. Price, 60
N.D. 272, 234 N.W. 63 (1931) (failure) ; Oppenheim v. Barnes, 793 Okla. 236,
144 P.2d 446 (1943) (want) ; Maston v. Glen Lumber Co., 65 Okla. 80, 163
Pac. 128 (1917) (failure); Beauchamp v. Jordan, 176 Ore. 320, 157 P.2d 504
(1945) (want and failure) ; Smith v. Stevens, 56 S.D. 583, 229 N.W. 938 (1930)
(want) ; Howell v. Tomlinson, 228 S.W.2d 112 (Tenn. App. 1949) (failure);
Long v. Range, 213 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. App. 1948) (want) ; Kliesing v. Del Barto,
282 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) (want); Friddell v. Greathouse, 230
S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) (failure) ; Greenwood v. Lamson, 106 Vt. 37,
168 Atl. 915 (1933) (want and failure) ; Trevillian v. Bullock, 185 Va. 958, 40
S.E.2d 920 (1947) (want and failure) ; Lee v. Swanson, 190 Wash. 580, 69 P.2d
824 (1937) (failure) ; In re Hatten's Estate, 233 Wis. 199, 288 N.W. 278 (1940)
(want) (semble). See also collection of cases in 127 A.L.R. 1003 (1940).
Effect of action being brought by endorsee not a holder in due course. In all
states except Florida, the allocation of the burden of persuasion appears generally
to be unaffected by the fact that the action is brought by an endorsee. See White
v. Camp, 1 Fla. 109 (1846).
73. See note 70 supra. It was pointed out in First State Bank v. Radke, 51
N.D. 246, 199 N.W. 930 (1924) that Sections 24 and 28 contain no provision
similar to that found in Section 59, which puts the burden upon the payee or
holder in cases where evidence introduced tends to show a want or failure of con-
sideration. It was the court's position that the omission of this express provision
was not accidental, but was the deliberate intent of the framers of the NIL to
cast upon the maker the duty of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the
defenses of want and failure of consideration.
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the burden of persuasion is placed on defendant, if the defense
urged is want of consideration, defendant must prove the ab-
sence of all elements which in the contemplation of law could
constitute a sufficient consideration.7 4  Consideration may exist
in many forms, and proof of the absence of one kind of consid-
eration does not necessarily disprove the presence of another
kind. When the defense urged is failure of consideration, how-
ever, defendant need prove only the identity and subsequent
failure of the consideration intended to support the instrument. 75
A minority view in effect takes the position that the NIL
does not regulate the procedural matter of allocating the burden
of proving want or failure of consideration, with the result that
in these jurisdictions the burden of persuasion is placed accord-
ing to precedent, or by the effect of special statutes.7 0 Louisi-
ana is a member of this minority position, and places the burden
74. American National Bank v. Woolard, 342 Ill. 148, 173 N.E. 787 (1930) ;
Drake v. Seck, 161 Kan. 717, 229 Pac. 69 (1924) ; Home State Bank v. De Witt,
121 Kan. 29, 245 Pac. 1036 (1926) ; Rose v. Kallahan, 284 S.W.2d 838 (Ky. App.
1955) ; Kleising v. Del Barto, 282 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
75. Columbia Restaurant v. Sadnovick, 157 So. 280 (La. App. 1934) ; Indiana
Flooring Co. v. Rudnick, 236 Mass. 90, 127 N.E. 428 (1920). See also Note, 25
COLUM. L. REv. 83 (1925).
76. Florida: Burden of persuasion in defense of failure of consideration is on
plaintiff under a Florida statute. Towles v. Azar, 112 Fla. 405, 150 So. 734
(1933). But if an endorsee is suing on the note, the burden rests on defendant.
See note 72 supra. No Florida cases were found concerning the defense of want
of consideration. Iowa: In defense of want of consideration, plaintiff bears bur-
den of persuasion. In re Custer's Estate, 229 Iowa 1061, 295 N.W. 848 (1941).
But, when failure of consideration is pleaded, it appears that the defendant bears
the burden of persuasion. First Presbyterian Church of Mt. Vernon v. Dennis,
178 Iowa 1352, 161 N.W. 183 (1917) (semble). Louisiana: As will more fully
appear below, when either of these defenses are pleaded Louisiana places the bur-
den of persuasion on plaintiff to prove the existence of consideration.. See notes
77 and 78 infra. North Carolina: Plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion when
the defense is want of consideration. Stein v. Levins, 205 N.C. 302, 171 S.E. 96
(1933). No cases were found involving failure of consideration. Ohio: Plaintiff
bears burden of persuasion in defense of want of consideration. In re Kennedy's
Estate, 82 Ohio App. 359, 80 N.E.2d 810 (1948). But when the defense is failure
of consideration, the defendant bears the burden of proof. Bear v. Bear, 29 Ohio
App. 272, 162 N.E. 711 (1928). But see Note, 18 U. Cne. L. REV. 219 (1949), to
the effect that in light of Darby v. Chambers, 70 Ohio App. 287, 46 N.E.2d 302
(1942) (decided prior to In re Kennedy's Estate) Ohio may have no compelling
authority as concerns the burden of persuasion in the defense of want of consid-
eration. New York: In defense of want of consideration, plaintiff bears burden of
persuasion. Bay Parkway National Bank v. Shalom, 146 Misc. 431, 261 N.Y.
Supp. 347 (Spec. term 1932). But defendant bears burden of persuasion when the
defense is failure of consideration. Bentley, Settle Co. v. Brinkman, 42 N.Y.S.2d
194 (Sup. Ct. 1943). Rhode Island: Plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion when
defense is want of consideration. Notarianni v. Di Muccio, 58 R.I. 504, 193 Atl.
617 (1937). Burden of persuasion rests on defendant when failure of considera-
tion is pleaded. Sixth St. Realty Co. v. Horowitz, 50 R.I. 445, 148 Atl. 597 (1930).
No cases specifically covering the burden of persuasion were found for South
Carolina, New Mexico, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
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of persuasion on plaintiff in both the defenses of want 7" and
failure78 of consideration.79
It appears that the allocation of the burden of persuasion is
unaffected by the fact that the instrument recites on its face
that it was given "for value received."' 0 It is unsettled whether
the allocation of the burden of persuasion is affected if plaintiff
unnecessarily alleges a consideration."'
Although the procedure to establish the defenses of want
and failure of consideration is complex in jurisdictions in which
suits on negotiable instruments are tried before a jury,82 in
77. Bernard Bros. v. Dugas, 229 La. 181, 85 So.2d 257 (1956) ; Moss v. Robin-
son, 216 La. 295, 43 So.2d 613 (1949) ; Bank of Coushatta v. Debose, 10 So.2d
386 (La. App. 1942) ; Succession of Galiano, 195 So. 377 (La. App. 1940) ; Fifth
District Finance Co. v. Smith, 179 So. 612 (La. App. 1938) ; Columbia Restaurant
v. Sadnovick, 157 So. 280 (La. App. 1934) ; McKnight v. Cornet, 143 So. 726 (La.
App. 1932). See also Carrol v. Peters, 1 McGloin 88 (La. 1880) ; Martin v. Don-
ovan, 15 La. Ann. 41 (1860) (pre-NIL in Louisiana).
78. Redi-Spuds Inc. v. Dickey, 230 La. 406, 88 So.2d 801 (1956); Bernard
Bros. v. Dugas, 229 La. 181, 85 So.2d 257 (1956) ; Columbia Restaurant v. Sad-
novick, 157 So. 280 (La. App. 1934).
79. Although many Louisiana opinions on the subject are not sufficiently
descriptive of the case to determine whether the court is speaking of the burden
of persuasion or the duty to overcome the statutory presumption of consideration,
it would appear that on several occasions the courts have placed the burden of
persuasion on the defendant. See Gaddis v. Brown, 1 So.2d 845 (La. App. 1941)
(want) ; Gillon v. Miller, 130 So. 672 (La. App. 1930) (failure) ; Maison Blanche
Co. v. Putfark, 119 So. 289 (La. App. 1928) (failure). In Daniel v. Hernandez,
173 So. 482, 484 (La. App. 1937), the court held "a plea of want or failure of
consideration in an action on a promissory note, is one of confession and avoid-
ance and ... the burden of proof is upon the maker of the note." The defense of
failure of consideration was characterized in Reconstruction Finance Corp. v.
Hutchinson, 1 So.2d 423, 425 (La. App. 1941) as being "an affirmative and special
defense [and being so] the burden of proof rested on the defendant to support
it." Despite these cases it is well settled in Louisiana today that the burden rests
on plaintiff.
80. All cases found which expressly considered the effect of the words "value
received" held that these words had no effect on the burden of persuasion. See
Best v. Rocky Mt. National Bank, 37 Colo. 149, 85 Pac. 1124 (1906) ; Huntington
v. Shute, 108 Mass. 371, 62 N.E. 380 (1902) ; In re Wood's Estate, 299 Mich. 635,
1 N.W.2d 19 (1941); Chapman v. First National Bank, 275 S.W. 498 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1924).
81. If plaintiff unnecessarily sets out the consideration, he must prove it:
Bailey v. Bailey, 297 Ky. 400, 180 S.W.2d 316 (1944) ; Cobb v. Farm & Merchants
Bank, 267 Ky. 744, 103 S.W.2d 264 (1937) ; Torian v. Caldwell, 178 Ky. 509, 199
S.W. 35 (1917). Contra, Ballard v. Breigh, 262 S.W. 886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
82. This complexity arises from the interdependent procedural rules regarding
submission of a case to the jury, the awarding of a non-suit, and the direction of
verdicts, which accompany trial by jury. In addition to this, there is confusion
existing as to the respective responsibilities of plaintiff and defendant in establish-
ing a defense of want or failure of consideration. This confusion has resulted from
the indiscriminate use of the term "burden of proof" by many courts to connote
two different legal concepts of evidence - the concept of the "duty of producing
evidence," and that of "the burden of persuasion." The duty of producing evidence
means the procedural duty of adducing evidence sufficient to take the case to the
jury. The burden of persuasion means the ultimate burden of convincing the jury
by a preponderance of the evidence. The loci of these two burdens were expressed
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Louisiana, where juries are rarely used in such cases, the pro-
cedure is relatively simple. s3 The burden of persuasion, which
Louisiana places on the plaintiff, never shifts, 4 but remains on
plaintiff throughout the trial.8 5 As previously indicated, when
plaintiff has availed himself of the statutory presumption of
consideration under Section 24, a prima facie case for recovery
on the instrument is established. If defendant fails to introduce
evidence of the alleged want or failure of consideration,"6 or if
in Downs v. Horton, 287 Mo. 414, 432, 230 S.W. 103, 109 (1921) as follows:
"The burden of proof, in the sense of the duty of producing evidence . . . passes
from party to party as the case progresses, while the burden of proof, meaning the
obligation to establish the truth of the claim by a preponderance of the evidence
• . . never shifts during the course of the trial." See also In re Kennedy's Estate,
82 Ohio App. 359, 80 N.E.2d 810 (1948). As the defendant is the proponent of
the defense of want or failure of consideration he first bears the "burden of pro-
ducing evidence." When the defendant has offered evidence sufficient for the
court to submit the case to the jury over a motion by the plaintiff for a directed
verdict, the defendant is said to have made a prima facie defense. Evidence suffi-
cient to take the case to the jury is that evidence from which reasonable men could
conclude that the claims of a party are true- at this stage of the trial, that the
defendant's claim of a want or failure of consideration is true. To avoid a directed
verdict under these circumstances, plaintiff would have to offset the defendant's
prima facie defense by adducing evidence from which reasonable men could con-
dude that a valid consideration exists for the instrument. In this situation it is
sometimes said that the "burden of producing evidence" shifted to the plaintiff. If
the plaintiff fails to meet this burden, then the defendant is entitled to a directed
verdict maintaining his defense. If on the other hand, the plaintiff meets the bur-
den of producing evidence, and reasonable men could conclude (but would not be
compelled to conclude) that consideration exists for the instrument, then there is
an issue of fact for submission to the jury under an appropriate instruction as to
which party bears the "burden of persuasion." See, generally, MCCORMICK, THE
LAw OF EVIDENCE §§ 306, 307 (1955) ; 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2485, 2487 (3d
ed. 1940).
83. In Louisiana, under Article 494 of the Louisiana Code of Practice of 1870,
jury trials are permitted in suits on negotiable instruments where the defendant
makes an oath that there was a want or failure of consideration for the instru-
ment. As a practical matter, since the appellate courts of Louisiana may review
findings of fact as well as findings of law, suits on negotiable instruments are
almost never tried by a jury. Relatively speaking, therefore, the burden of proof
in Louisiana is simple as compared to the burden in states where trial is custom-
arily by jury.
84. It is generally accepted that the "burden of persuasion" does not shift.
Clapper v. Lakin, 343 Mo. 710, 128 S.W.2d 27 (1938) ; Downs v. Horton, 287 Mo.
414, 230 S.W. 103 (1921); Fitzsimons v. Frey, 153 Neb. 124, 43 N.W.2d 531
(1950) ; In re Atkinson's Will, 225 N.C. 526, 35 S.E.2d 638 (1945). The writers
are in general agreement: MCCORMICK, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 307 (1954);
McKELvEY, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 47 (1944) ; 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2489
(3d ed. 1940).
85. There is some academic disagreement on the question of whether the burden
of persuasion is allocated from the inception of the suit, or whether it does not
come into play until the end of the proofs. Wigmore and McKelvey take the former
position. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2489 (3d ed. 1940) ; MCKELvEY, THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 47 (1944). This would seem to be the better position. McCormick,
however, contends that the burden of persuasion does not come into play until the
end of the proofs, until the judge charges the jury, or in a judge-tried case, until
he finds himself in doubt on the facts. McCoRMICK, TE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 307
(1954).
86. Jackson v. Kelly, 179 La. 757, 155 So. 15 (1934) ; Maison Blanche Co. v.
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the evidence which he adduces is insufficient to overcome plain-
tiff's statutory presumption,87 defendant's plea of want or
failure of consideration will be rejected, and judgment will be
given for plaintiff. Under these circumstances plaintiff's stat-
utory presumption of consideration has sufficient probative
value to meet the burden of persuasion and entitle plaintiff to a
judgment. In order to overcome plaintiff's presumption of
consideration, defendant must do more than merely deny the
existence of consideration ;88 he must introduce evidence, the
minimum effect of which is to "cast doubt or suspicion on the
reality of a consideration." 89  This rule is not affected by the
fact that under the circumstances any evidence which could
show a want or failure of consideration is peculiarly within the
knowledge of plaintiff.90 If defendant successfully overcomes
plaintiff's presumption of consideration, the presumption and
its artificial probative value are destroyed,91 and plaintiff is un-
Putfark, 119 So. 289 (La. App. 1928) ; Mercantile Adjustment Agency v. Palmi-
sano, 2 La. App. 443 (1925) ; Drake v. Seek, 116 Kan. 717, 229 Pac. 67 (1924).
87. Redi-Spuds Inc. v. Dickey, 230 La. 406, 88 So.2d 801 (1956) ; McKnight
v. Cornet, 143 So. 726 (La. App. 1932).
88. Collateral Liquidation v. Manning, 287 Mich. 568, 283 N.W. 691 (1939);
In re Wood's Estate, 229 Mich. 635, 1 N.W.2d 19 (1941) ; Watts v. Copeland, 170
S.C. 449, 170 S.E. 780 (1933) ; Brown v. King, 7 La. App. 570 (1928) (semble) ;
Friddell v. Greathouse, 230 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950). See also Pack v.
Chapman, 16 La. Ann. 366 (1861) (pre-NIL in Louisiana).
89. Redi-Spuds v. Dickey, 230 La. 406, 88 So.2d 801 (1956) ; Bernard Bros.
v. Dugas, 229 La. 181, 85 So.2d 257 (1956) ; Bevis v. Alexander, 88 So.2d 398 (La.
App. 1956) ; Moss v. Robinson, 216 La. 295, 43 So.2d 613 (1949) ; Fifth District
Finance Co. v. Smith, 179 So. 612 (La. App. 1938); Columbia Restaurant V.
Sadnovick, 157 So. 280 (La. App. 1934) ; McKnight v. Cornet, 143 So. 726 (La.
App. 1932); Friel v. Murchison, 3 La. App. 559 (1926); Burke v. Peter, 115
Utah 58, 202 P.2d 543 (1949). See also Carrol v. Peters, 1 McGloin 88 (La. 1880)
(pre-NIL in Louisiana).
Note signed after erecution and delivery by additional maker or by endorsee.
In order to rebut the statutory presumption of consideration for the signature of
an additional maker or endorsee who signed the instrument after its execution and
delivery, evidence must be presented which negates any promise by maker to payee
at or before delivery of the instrument that the instrument would be signed by
such additional maker or by such endorsee. Dittmar v. Frye, 200 Wash. 451, 93
P.2d 709 (1939). See Annot., 124 A.L.R. 717 (1940).
90. American National Bank v. Woolard, 342 Ill. 148, 173 N.E. 787 (1930)
Drake v. Seck, 116 Kan. 717, 229 Pac. 67 (1924).
91. The weight of authority is that once a presumption of fact has been over-
come, the presumption ceases to exist and has no evidentiary value. This position
was taken in Nicholson v. Neary, 77 Wash. 294, 137 Pac. 492 (1914) in a case
involving the presumption of consideration for a negotiable instrument. Contra,
Bevis v. Alexander, 88 So.2d 1956 (La. App. 1956) dictum. This case appears to
be out of line with the accepted view. For a collection of cases see 95 A.L.R. 878
(1935). 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2491 (3d ed. 1940). Wigmore states that the fal-
lacy that a presumption which has been overcome does have evidentiary value arose
through "attempting to follow the ancient Continental phraseology, which grew up
under the quantitative system of evidence fixing artificial rules for the judge's
measure of proof." Id. at 291. That a presumption which has been overcome has
no evidentiary value is also the position of the ALI, MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE,
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aided in his task of meeting the burden of persuasion which
has rested upon him throughout the trial.92 To recover on the
instrument, plaintiff must now introduce evidence of sufficient
probative value to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the instrument is supported by a valid consideration."
Proof of Defense of Want or Failure of Consideration as Placing
Burden on Holder Under Section 59 to Prove Himself En-
titled to Rights of Holder in Due Course
Under Section 59 of the NIL "every holder is deemed prima
facie to be a holder in due course; but when it is shown that
the title of any person who has negotiated the instrument was
defective, the burden94 is on the holder to prove that he or some
person under whom he claims acquired the title as holder in due
course. '95 (Emphasis added.) Section 55 sets forth the circum-
stances which constitute a defective title "within the meaning of
this act." 96  Want or failure of consideration, however, is not
such a circumstance. Accordingly, a majority of the courts which
have considered the question hold that proof by the maker of a
want or failure of consideration does not operate to place the
burden on the holder to prove that he or some person under
Rule 704(2) (1942), and the NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNI-
FO M STATE LAWS, UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE, Rule 14 (1953).
92. Some Louisiana cases indicate that when defendant overcomes the statutory
presumption of consideration, "the burden of proof" then "shifts" to the plaintiff
to prove consideration by a preponderance of the evidence. Bernard Bros. v. Dugas,
229 La. 181, 85 So.2d 257 (1956); Bank of Coushatta v. Debose, 10 So.2d 386
(La. App. 1942) ; Columbia Restaurant v. Sadnovick, 157 So. 280 (La. App.
1934) ; McKnight v. Cornet, 143 So. 726 (La. App. 1932). It is submitted that
this is not an accurate description of the procedure under which plaintiff must
prove the existence of a consideration for the instrument. As previously noted, the
burden of proof in the sense of "the burden of persuasion" does not shift. See
note 84 8upra. It is probable that the Louisiana courts have confused the "bur-
den of persuasion" with the plaintiff's "duty of producing evidence" when defend-
ant has overcome the presumption of consideration. See note 82 supra.
93. Redi-Spuds v. Dickey, 230 La. 406, 88 So.2d 801 (1956) ; Bernard Bros.
v. Dugas, 229 La. 181, 85 So.2d 257 (1956) ; Moss v. Robinson, 216 La. 295, 43
So.2d 613 (1949) ; Bank of Coushatta v. Debose, 10 So.2d 386 (La. App. 1942) ;
Succession of Galiano, 195 So. 377 (La. App. 1940); Columbia Restaurant v.
Sadnovick, 157 So. 280 (La. App. 1934) ; McKnight v. Cornet, 143 So. 726 (La.
App. 1932).
94. According to the weight of authority "burden" as used in NIL § 59 means
the burden of persuasion, i.e., proof by a preponderance of the evidence. See
Annot., 152 A.L.R. 1331 (1944). See also BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
LAW 876 (Beutel's 7th ed. 1948) ; Comment, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 717 (1932).
95. LA. R.S. 7:59 (1950). This section continues: "But the last mentioned
rule does not apply in favor of a party who became bound on the instrument prior
to the acquisition of such defective title." For the law under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code on this point, see note 98 infra.
96. LA. R.S. 7:55 (1950).
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whom he claims acquired the title as the holder in due course. 97
Under this view, defendant bears the burden of proving that
plaintiff is not entitled to the rights of a holder in due course.
Until this is proved, it would appear that defendant cannot
introduce evidence to prove a defense of want or failure of con-
sideration.
A few courts, however, hold that proof of want or failure
of consideration by the defendant will bring Section 59 into
operation and require the plaintiff to bear the burden of proving
that he is entitled to the rights of a holder in due course.98
Louisiana adheres to this view.99 While this view is clearly
contrary to the provisions of the act, it is likely that courts ad-
hering to this position are guided by the belief that a party who
claims the special rights of a holder in due course should be
required to prove his bona fide character when the obligor on
the instrument proves circumstances concerning the instrument
of which the holder need only have knowledge in order to be
disqualified as a holder in due course. While this policy has its
merits, it must be recognized as judicial legislation.
97. Lawrence v. Tennessee Valley Bank, 224 Ala. 692, 141 So. 664 (1932);
Hamburg Bank v. Ahrens, 118 Ark. 548, 177 S.W. 14 (1915) ; Tildon Lumber &
Mill Co. v. Bacon Land Co., 116 Cal. App. 689, 3 P.2d 350 (1931) ; Ohio Contract
Purchase Co. v. Bolin, 168 N.E. 196 (Ind. App. 1929) ; Hill v. Dillon, 176 Mo.
App. 192, 161 S.W. 881 (1913) ; Lister v. Donlan, 85 Mont. 571, 281 Pac. 348
(1929) ; Staten Island National Bank & Trust Co. v. Buccello, 146 N.Y.S.2d 448
(Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1955) ; Standing Stone National Bank v. Walser, 162 N.C.
53, 77 S.E. 1006 (1913) ; Colonial Finance Co. v. Hoover, 112 Pa. Super. 60, 170
Atl. 338 (1934) ; Cole Banking Co. v. Sinclair, 34 Utah 454, 98 Pac. 411 (1908) ;
People's Finance & Thrift Co. v. De Berry, 50 Wyo. 301, 62 P.2d 307 (1936).
See also Crosby v. Ritchey, 56 Neb. 336, 76 N.W. 895 (1898) ; Bank of Topeka v.
Nelson, 58 Kan. 815, 49 Pac. 155 (1897) (pre-NIL cases).
98. Industrial Loan & Trust Co. v. Bell, 30 Ill. App. 502, 21 N.E.2d 638
(1939); Owsley County Deposit Bank v. Burns, 196 Ky. 359, 244 S.W. 755
(1922); Sharp v. Kelsey, 184 Okla. 288, 86 P.2d 994 (1939) ; Furst & Furst v.
Freels, 9 Tenn. App. 423 (1928) ; Taylor & Co. v. Nehi Bottling Co., 30 S.W.2d
494 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) ; National City Bank v. Shelton Electric Co., 96 Wash.
74, 164 Pac. 933 (1917) (dictum). See Louisiana cases cited in note 99 infra.
Commercial Credit Corp. v. Setliff, 44 So.2d 167, 170 (La. App. 1950) : "The
burden is upon the holder . . . not only to show that he took the instrument in
good faith for value, but also to go further and prove want of consideration on
his part of the infirmity."
This is the view adopted by the Uniform Commercial Code. Under UCC§ 3-307(3) proof of the defense of want or failure of consideration would operate
to place the burden on the plaintiff to prove he is entitled to the rights of a holder
in due course. This article provides: "After evidence of a defense has been intro-
duced a person claiming the rights of a holder in due course has the burden of
establishing that he or some person under whom he claims was in all respects a
holder in due course."
99. Credit Industrial Co. v. Jewell, 58 So.2d 239 (La. App. 1952) ; Commercial
Credit Corp. v. Setliff, 44 So.2d 167 (La. App. 1950) ; Toms v. Nugent, 12 So.2d
713 (La. App. 1943) ; Tolmas v. Norwood, 132 So. 148 (La. App. 1931) ; Stevens
v. Sonnier, 122 So. 894 (La. App. 1929).
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Conduct of Defendant Which Precludes Him from Asserting
the Defenses
Though a defendant may be in all other respects entitled to
urge the defenses of want or failure of consideration in a suit
on a negotiable instrument, nevertheless certain conduct on his
part will preclude him from asserting these defenses. This re-
sult may arise from public policy, or from the theories of estop-
pel, or waiver.
When a dispute arises over the amount owed on an open
account, if the debtor executes a note for the full amount claimed
by the creditor, the debtor thereby waives the defense of want of
consideration to a suit brought on the instrument. 100 Similarly,
when the consideration for a note has failed or is lacking, and
the maker admits his signature to a proposed purchaser of the
instrument without disclosing the vice in the consideration01
or represents to the proposed purchaser that the instrument is
valid,10 2 the maker will be estopped from asserting the defenses
when the party purchases the note and later brings an action on
the instrument. 0 3
One who enables bank officials to deceive bank examiners
by signing a note for the accommodation of the bank,'0 4 or who
signs a note under an agreement that it shall not be enforced, 105
cannot thereafter defend an action on the instrument on the
ground of want of consideration. 0 6 While most courts base
100. Arkansas Fuel Co. v. Underwood, 193 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
The court drew an analogy to waiver of the defenses on a note when a renewal
note is given. See page 486 infra.
101. Valley Securities Co. v. Brazier, 132 So. 669 (La. App. 1931).
102. Norment v. First National Bank, 23 N.M. 198, 167 Pac. 731 (1917);
Bank of Centerville v. Larson, 47 S.D. 374, 199 N.W. 46 (1924).
103. In Officer v. Owens, 252 Fed. 337 (2d Cir. 1918), on a separate cause
of action the maker had previously obtained judgment for damages against plain-
tiff, which damages were in part based on notes which plaintiff held. Held, in suit
by plaintiff on the notes, maker estopped to assert defense of want of consideration.
104. Mt. Vernon Trust Co. v. Oakwood Gardens, 254 App. Div. 686, 3 N.Y.S.2d
532 (2d Dept. 1938) ; First National Bank v. Smith, 132 Pa. Super. 73, 200 Atl.
215 (1938) ; Whitesboro National Bank v. Wells, 143 Tex. 232, 184 S.W.2d 276
(1944). For a collection of earlier cases, see Annot., 64 A.L.R. 595 (1929).
105. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Lynch, 46 F. Supp. 466 (E.D.N.Y.
1942) ; Wood v. Kennedy, 117 Cal. App. 53, 3 P.2d 366 (1931) ; Tarrytown Na-
tional Bank & Trust Co. v. MacMahon, 250 App. Div. 739, 293 N.Y. Supp. 513 (2d
Dept. 1937).
106. It appears that this rule holds true even though the defendant was "very
ignorant and ill informed of the character of the transaction." See Rinaldi v.
Young, 67 App. D.C. 305, 92 F.2d 229 (1937). For a good discussion of the
effect of defendant's knowledge of the nature of the transaction, see D'oench,
Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 117 F.2d 491 (Mo. Cir. 1941),
aft'd, 315 U.S. 447 (1941), rehearing denied, 315 U.S. 830 (1941).
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their decisions in these cases on the theory of estoppel, a few
courts more realistically declare that they rest their decisions
on public policy. 10 7 Some courts, however, hold that even though
the banking examiners are deceived, the defense of want of con-
sideration is available to defendant if the bank remains sol-
vent.10
It has also been held that if a maker has knowledge of facts
constituting a defense on his note, but nevertheless secures an
extension of the maturity date, he thereby ratifies the instru-
ment and waives his right to assert the defenses. 109
Renewal note. It is well settled that if a maker has no actual
or imputed knowledge of a want or failure of consideration for
his note, the fact that he gives a renewal note in lieu of paying
the original instrument does not preclude him from asserting
the defense of want or failure of consideration in an action on
the renewal instrument. 110 Many jurisdictions hold, however,
that where there is a failure of consideration on a note, the fact
that the maker knows of this defect, but nevertheless gives the
payee a renewal note, operates to waive"' the defense of failure
of consideration on the renewal instrument. 1 2  It appears that
this rule applies not only when the original instrument remains
in the hands of the payee, but also when the original note is
107. Wood v. Wilhoit, 291 Ky. 175, 164 S.W.2d 478 (1942) (public policy);
Mt. Vernon Trust Co. v. Oakwood Gardens, 254 App. Div. 686, 3 N.Y.S.2d 532
(2d Dept. 1938) (estoppel).
108. Whitesboro National Bank v. Wells, 143 Tex. 232, 184 S.W.2d 276
(1944) ; Whitcher v. Waddell, 42 Wyo. 274, 292 Pac. 1091 (1930).
109. Taylor Jr. & Sons v. First National Bank, 212 Fed. 898 (6th Cir. 1914)
(failure of consideration). The court in this case drew an analogy to renewal
notes. See also Arkansas Fuel Oil Co. v. Underwood, 193 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1946) ; Twitchell v. Klinke, 272 S.W. 283 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
110. Stewart v. Simon, 111 Ark. 358, 163 S.W. 1135 (1914) ; William Barco
& Son v. Forbes, 194 N.C. 204, 139 S.E. 227 (1927). For a collection of cases,
see Annot., 72 A.L.R. 600 (1931). This holding is implicit in all recent cases
on the subject.
111. The majority of cases involving renewal notes wherein the maker is pre-
cluded from bringing a defense are based on the theory of waiver. Some decisions,
however, utilize the theory of estoppel.
112. Moore v. Wade, 174 Ark. 984, 186 S.W. 828 (1916) ; Hurner v. Mutual
Bankers Corp., 140 Fla. 435, 191 So. 831 (1939) ; Farmers' & Merchants' Savings
Bank v. Jones, 196 Iowa 1071, 196 N.W. 57 (1923) ; Howell v. Flora, 155 Kan.
640, 127 P.2d 721 (1942) ; Gay v. First National Bank, 172 Miss. 681, 160 So.
904 (1935) (senble) ; Luft v. Strobel, 322 Mo. 955, 19 S.W.2d 721 (1929) ; Wil-
liam Barco & Son v. Forbes, 194 N.C. 204, 139 S.E. 227 (1927); Ponca City
Building & Loan Co. v. Graff, 189 Okla. 410, 117 P.2d 514 (1941); Moran v.
Security Bank & Trust Co., 181 Okla. 181, 72 P.2d 814 (1937) ; First National
Bank v. Singer, 322 Pa. 207, 185 Atl. 647 (1936) ; First National Bank v. Smith,
132 Pa. Super. 73, 200 Atl. 215 (1938) ; J. B. Colt Co. v. Ellis, 293 S.W. 629(Tex. Civ. App. 1927). Contra, Scandinavian American Bank v. Westby, 41 N.D.
276, 172 N.W. 665 (1918).
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transferred to a holder not in due course,113 and the maker
executes a renewal note in which such holder is named payee. 114
It appears to be unsettled whether the rule that a defense will be
waived if the maker knows of the vice when he executes a re-
newal note applies to the defense of want of consideration." 5
Cases which have specifically considered the question hold that
the maker need not have actual knowledge of the vice in the
original instrument when he executes the renewal note, but that
it is sufficient to constitute a waiver of the defense if the maker
had knowledge of facts sufficient to put him on inquiry, or if by
the exercise of ordinary diligence he could have discovered the
facts constituting such defense. 16
But even though a maker has knowledge of a want or failure
of consideration in his note, he will not be deemed to waive his
defense if he executes a renewal note to an endorsee of the orig-
inal instrument on the faith of the latter's false representation
that he is a holder in due course.117  By the same token, it ap-
pears that a maker with knowledge of a want or failure of con-
113. A holder in due course who acquires knowledge of a defense the maker
would have thereon against the payee does not lose his bona fide character if he
later accepts a renewal of the instrument. Molsons Bank v. Berman, 224 Mich.
606, 195 N.W. 75 (1923). See Annot., 35 A.L.R. 1294 (1925).
One not a holder in due course of an original note may not acquire that char-
acter simply because he takes the renewal note before it was overdue, for good
faith and value, and without any knowledge of infirmity. W. R. Grace & Co. v.
Strickland, 188 N.C. 369, 124 S.E. 856 (1924). See Annot., 35 A.L.R. 1300
(1925).
114. Moore v. Wade, 174 Ark. 984, 186 S.W. 828 (1916) ; Farmers' 'and Mer-
chants' Savings Bank v. Jones, 196 Iowa 1071, 196 N.W. 57 (1923). In First
National Bank v. Brown, 134 Tex. 38, 131 S.W.2d 958 (1939), the renewal note
was issued to a holder for value of accommodation paper, and the accommodation
maker urged that the renewal permitted him to urge the defense of want of con-
sideration even in the face of § 29. fHeld, as the holder for value took the note in
the first instance with the right to enforce the same, such holder did not lose this
right by taking a renewal.
115. Federal Chemical Co. v. Hitt, 155 S.W.2d 899 (Mo. App. 1941) ; Ford v.
Ford Roofing Products Co., 285 S.W. 538 (Mo. App. 1926). See also Scandi-
navian American Bank v. Westby, 41 N.D. 276, 172 N.W. 665 (1918). Support for
this proposition in First National Bank v. Smith, 132 Pa. Super. 73, 200 At. 215
(1938) is said to be on the theory that when there is a want of consideration
there is no enforceable contract or promise and thus no basis on which waiver or
estoppel by renewal can be predicated. The following cases, however, drew no
distinction between want and failure of consideration in this regard, and held
the renewal note constituted a waiver of the defense of want of consideration.
American National Bank v. Jorden, 123 Okla. 151, 254 Pac. 706 (1926) ; Davis
v. Donaldson, 91 S.W. 763 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
116. Hurner v. Mutual Bankers Corp., 140 Fla. 835, 191 So. 831 (1939)
Farmers' & Merchants' Savings Bank v. Jones, 196 Iowa 1071, 196 N.W. 57
(1923) ; Gay v. First National Bank, 172 Miss. 681, 160 So. 904 (1935) ; Howell
v. Flora, 155 Kan. 640, 127 P.2d 721 (1942) ; Ponca City Building & Loan Co. v.
Graff, 189 Okla. 410, 117 P.2d 514 (1941). But 8ee Goodwin v. Abeline State
Bank, 20 S.W.2d 1090 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
117. Moore v. Wade, 174 Ark. 984, 186 S.W. 828 (1916).
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sideration in his note who, for reasons of his own, wishes to
execute a renewal note without waiving his defenses, may pro-
tect against such waiver by executing a renewal instrument on
the condition that he reserves the right to assert any defenses
against an action on the renewal note which he might have had
on the original instrument. 118
Jesse D. McDonald
118. Weiser National Bank v. Peters, 174 Ark. 984, 298 S.W. 878 (1927)
(accommodation note renewed under strict understanding that accommodation
party would not be held liable on the renewal instrument). See also Rice v. Os-
borne, 306 Ky. 591, 208 S.W.2d 747 (1948).
